I study a principal-agent problem in which the principal can obtain additional costly information about the agent's e¤ort. I analyze this problem in the context of optimal unemployment insurance a la Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) , where job-search e¤ort is private information. I calibrate the model to the US economy and use it for two purposes. First, I show that for CRRA utility, the optimal contract dictates that monitoring frequency increases and the sanction decreases with promised utility, if and only if the coe¢ cient of risk aversion is greater than 0:5.
Introduction
Most unemployment insurance programs in the United States include monitoring of jobsearch e¤ort (Grubb, 2000) . A typical monitoring policy requires the unemployed worker to record her job-search activities by listing the employers she contacted in a given period.
At the employment o¢ ce, a caseworker occasionally evaluates whether the job-search requirements are met by verifying that the contacts are authentic. If the caseworker …nds the report unsatisfactory, then she may impose sanctions, usually in the form of a reduction in bene…ts for a limited period. 1 In this paper I incorporate monitoring into the principal-agent framework of optimal unemployment insurance developed by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) . Monitoring allows the principal (planner) to acquire a costly imperfect signal that is used in the contract. I calibrate the model to the US economy and use it for two purposes. First, I show how the planner combines the monitoring frequency with sanctions and rewards as a function of the labor market history of the worker. Second, I assess the e¤ectiveness of monitoring by estimating the fraction of moral hazard cost that is saved when monitoring is used.
In optimal unemployment insurance, a risk-neutral planner insures a risk-averse worker against unemployment by setting transfers during unemployment and a wage tax or a subsidy during employment. During unemployment, the worker searches for a job by exerting e¤ort, the level of which is her private information. Since the planner cannot observe the job-search e¤ort, the constant bene…ts that are implied by the …rst-best contract would undermine the worker's incentives to search for a job. Therefore, to solve the incentiveinsurance trade-o¤, bene…ts should continuously decrease during unemployment and the wage tax upon re-employment should continuously increase.
I include monitoring in this framework as follows. The planner monitors the unem-ployed worker at some history-dependent frequency. When a worker is monitored, the planner pays a cost and receives a signal that is correlated with the worker's job-search e¤ort. The planner uses that signal to improve the e¢ ciency of the contract by conditioning future payments and the wage tax not only on the employment outcome, but also on the signal. These future payments create endogenous sanctions and rewards that, together with the random monitoring, create e¤ective job-search incentives. The worker exerts a high job-search e¤ort in order to increase the probability of a good signal and, consequently, increase the probability of higher payments.
I characterize the optimal contract using a calibration of the model to the US economy for a worker with logarithmic utility from consumption. The monitoring frequency and the dispersion of future utilities complement one another in creating the incentives for the worker to search actively for a job. The speci…c combination of those two components depends on promised utility, which represents the welfare system's generosity. As the generosity of the welfare system increases, the planner monitors the unemployed worker more frequently but imposes lower sanctions. The driving force of this result is that while the per-unit cost of monitoring is independent of the generosity of the welfare system, as I show below the cost of spreading out future utilities increases with generosity.
In Appendix A, I describe a two-period model that captures the same economic forces as the in…nite-horizon model. Speci…cally, the possible outcomes, their probabilities, and the choice variables of the planner are all identical to the in…nite-horizon model. The theoretical solution to this model is consistent with the description of the results above.
These results are carried to any parametrization of the model as long as the utility from consumption is logarithmic.
I then show that the characteristics of the optimal contract continue to hold in the in…nite-horizon model for any CRRA preferences with a coe¢ cient of risk aversion of at least 0.5. When < 0:5 the exact opposite happens: As the generosity increases, the monitoring frequency decreases and the spread between future utilities (henceforth, spreads) increases. This happens because = 0:5 is the cuto¤ point between spreading costs that increase with generosity ( > 0:5) and spreading costs that decrease with generosity.
The calibrated model is also used for estimating the value of monitoring by comparing the results of this model to those of a model where monitoring technology is unavailable.
Keeping utility …xed, I compare the gain from monitoring to the gain from shifting to the …rst-best allocation. This comparison is conducted at the generosity level that balances the government budget when applying the model with no monitoring. I …nd that the gain from monitoring equals roughly 80% of the di¤erence between the planner's value of the …rst best and the value in the model without monitoring. These savings stem from the planner's ability to smooth the worker's consumption across states. Indeed, monitoring decreases about half the standard deviation of consumption.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I describe the relevant literature. In Section 3, I describe the model. In Section 4, I calibrate the model to the US economy. In Section 5, I characterize the optimal monitoring policy and estimate the value of monitoring. In Section 6, I conclude and discuss further research.
Literature review
A typical assumption in principal-agent models that include costly state veri…cation is that monitoring perfectly reveals the agent's hidden information (or action) to the principal. 2 In a standard environment, such signals allow the planner to get arbitrarily close to the …rst-best allocation, by using a combination of very low monitoring frequencies (that cost very little) with extremely severe punishments that will never be applied.
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Allowing the signal to be imperfect as assumed in this paper has three salient implications. First, the monitoring probability becomes a decision variable. Second, the contract dictates endogenous limited sanctions and rewards. Third, sanctions are applied in equilibrium. These results are realistic for many applications of monitoring, including that of unemployment insurance bene…ts. Speci…cally, maximal sanctions are usually not practiced and monitoring is not applied with certainty.
Since the ability of the planner to acquire costly noisy information is common to many principal-agent settings, I …rst review models of monitoring in various contexts, with either perfect or imperfect signals. Aiyagari and Alvarez (1995) allow perfect-signal monitoring in a principal-agent problem with hidden information. In their model, the planner may deprive the agent of her leisure and determine her consumption. The authors characterize the optimal monitoring frequency over compact consumption sets to avoid making the monitoring technology so powerful that the problem becomes uninteresting. The existence of consumption bounds lead to non monotone monitoring frequency. Popov (2009) models veri…cation of hidden information as reported by a worker. Popov keeps the problem nontrivial by assuming that the utility function is bounded from below and that the continuation utility is bounded. With this assumption, the contract delivers bounded sanctions and rewards, depending on the veri…cation result. He …nds that monitoring never occurs with certainty and that for a certain class of utility functions, the principal uses veri…cation regardless of this cost. Newman (2007) studies entrepreneurial risk and occupational self-selection. He uses a static principal-agent problem to study the optimal match between exogenous monitoring technologies and workers who di¤er by their outside option. The available monitoring technologies di¤er by their e¢ ciency in a way that can also be interpreted as providing an more e¤ective for the planner to extract imperfect information on the job-search e¤ort for a lower cost. imperfect signal. Newman shows that when workers have logarithmic utility, the optimal contract leads to positive assortative matching between workers with a higher level of promised utility and tasks that produce more observable output. I now turn to review studies that model monitoring speci…cally in the context of unemployment insurance. Boone, Fredriksson, Holmlund, and van Ours (2007) analyze the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework. They allow the signal to be imperfect but they restrict the set of policies among which the optimal policy is chosen. First, the planner does not condition bene…ts on the worker's history; second, the planner can apply only a …xed decrease in bene…ts for the remains of the unemployment spell. Their model, however, has the advantage of general equilibrium which my model lacks. Pavoni and Violante (2007) consider monitoring as part of an optimal Welfare-toWork program. In their model, the planner can perfectly observe the worker's job-search e¤ort by paying some cost. As a result, the planner monitors this e¤ort with certainty and sanctions or rewards are never needed. For a more complete review on models of job-search monitoring see Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006) . I conclude this section with some empirical evidence on the e¤ect of job-search monitoring and sanctions on labor market outcomes. The e¤ect of job-search monitoring on unemployment duration is usually signi…cant and positive.
4 Johnson and Klepinger (1994) use the Washington Alternative Work-Search Experiment, which includes random assignment of unemployed workers to treatment groups that di¤er in their job-search requirements. They …nd that waiving the weekly requirement to record three contacts increases the average unemployment spell by 3.3 weeks. Klepinger, johnson, Joesch, and Benus (1997) evaluate the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Work Search Demonstra-tion. They …nd that increasing the number of required contacts from two to four decreases the average unemployment spell by 5.9%. They also …nd that informing the unemployed workers that the contacts will be veri…ed decreases the average unemployment spell by 7.5%.
The evidence on the e¤ects of sanctions is limited yet encouraging. In two empirical studies conducted in the Netherlands, van den Berg, van der Klaauw, and van Ours (2004) and Abbring, van den Berg, and van Ours (2005) …nd that the unemployment exit rate doubles following a sanction. Lalive, van Ours, and Zweimeller (2005) use Swiss data on bene…t sanctions and …nd that warning about not complying with eligibility requirements and enforcement both have a positive e¤ect on the unemployment exit rate. In addition, increasing the monitoring intensity reduces the unemployment duration of non-sanctioned workers.
3 The model
The economy
Preferences: Workers have a period utility u (c) a; where c is consumption, a is disutility from job-search e¤ort or work, and u is strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Workers discount the future at the discount factor .
Employment and Unemployment:
The worker is either employed or unemployed.
During employment, which is assumed to be an absorbing state, the worker exerts a constant e¤ort level e w and receives a …xed periodic wage w.
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During unemployment, the worker searches for a job with an e¤ort level a 2 fe l ; e h g 5 The assumption that employment is an absorbing state is widely used in the literature (e.g., Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997 , Pavoni 2009 , and Pavoni and Violante 2007 . This assumption allows us to analyze one unemployment spell at a time, and does not a¤ect the qualitative characteristics of the optimal policy. Hopenhayn and Nicolini (2009) characterize the optimal unemployment insurance contract in environments in which workers experience multiple unemployment spells. that is either low or high. This e¤ort is the worker's private information. The job-…nding probability, denoted by j increases with the job-search e¤ort level j 2 fl; hg. The low job-search e¤ort is interpreted as not actively looking for a job; I therefore set e l = 0 and l = 0: For brevity of notation, I henceforth denote e h as e, and h as .
Monitoring technology: The monitoring probability 2 [0; 1] is a decision variable for the planner. When the worker is monitored, the planner receives a signal on the worker's job-search e¤ort that is either good or bad, denoted by fg; bg respectively. The probability of a good signal given job-search e¤ort j 2 fl; hg is j . The signal is only informative if h 6 = l : Hence, I assume, without loss of generality, that h > l : This means that following a high as opposed to a low job-search e¤ort, a monitored worker is more likely to receive the good signal. Note that this technology does not restrict the value of h to be higher than 0.5. Indeed, there may be some strict monitoring tests generating a useful signal for which h can be very small: Allowing h to be smaller than 1 indicates that the planner receives imperfect information regarding the worker's e¤ort. This false negative option is a realistic feature of the unemployment insurance system, representing a veri…cation that unjusti…ably fails.
Allowing l to be greater than 0 is another source of imperfection, representing a false positive result. This imperfection occurs, for example, due to an administrative failure or to caseworker over-generosity.
The cost of monitoring is quasi-concave in the monitoring frequency and equal to per period, with 1: This cost structure, covering constant and increasing returns to scale, discourages the planner from setting the monitoring frequency to 1 under all circumstances.
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Decreasing returns to scale seem unreasonable since the monitoring application can be split between caseworkers. Nevertheless, I study convex costs and show that qualitatively, the characteristics of the contract are identical to those of the quasi concave cost.
The assumption that only one monitoring technology is available to the planner can be relaxed by allowing the planner to choose a monitoring technology m from the set
; which includes N monitoring technologies.
Information structure: Both the worker and the planner observe the employment state, the monitoring signal and the on-the-job e¤ort level. 7 The worker's job-search e¤ort level is private information. This leads to the moral hazard problem.
Timing: Figure 1 shows the model's time frame and the four possible outcomes at the period's end. At the beginning of each period, the planner delivers consumption c to the worker. Then, the worker looks for a job with an e¤ort level e j and …nds a job with probability j : If the worker becomes employed, the planner does not apply monitoring.
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If, however, the worker remains unemployed, she is monitored with probability : When monitoring takes place, the planner pays the cost and receives the signal s 2 fg; bg. 
The planner' s problem
In general, the optimal contract between the planner and the worker requires conditioning the bene…ts and the wage tax on the worker's entire history. Spear and Srivastava (1987) , Thomas and Worral (1988) , Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) , and Phelan and Townsend (1991) …nd that all the relevant information for the recursive contract is contained in a one-dimensional object. In the monitoring recursive contract, as in the unemployment insurance contract, this one-dimensional state is the expected discounted utility U promised to the worker at the beginning of each period. This value is updated at the end of each period, according to the outcomes. Hence, this state is governed by all the relevant information in the worker's history. Although this state is not a primitive of the model, using it makes the problem tractable. Once the model is solved, the state is used to recover the allocation for each type of worker.
In what follows, I present the planner problems for an employed worker and an unemployed one.
The planner' s problem for an employed worker
Let W (U ) be the planner's value from an employed worker who has promised utility U:
The planner's problem for an employed worker is:
s:t: :
where U e is the future promised utility contingent on employment. If c > w; then the planner delivers the di¤erence to the worker as a wage subsidy; if c < w, then the planner extracts the di¤erence as a wage tax. The constraint in the problem, commonly known as the promise-keeping constraint, states that the expected discounted utility has to be at least equal the utility that was promised to the worker at the beginning of the period.
Given the absence of moral hazard during employment, the solution to the employment problem is full insurance and constant bene…ts. This implies a constant wage tax or subsidy.
The planner' s problem for an unemployed worker
I assume that the government announces its policy at time zero and commits itself to it.
This assumption eliminates policies in which the planner deviates from the announced policy (e.g. no monitoring ex-post) whereas workers update their beliefs according to the observed government policy. 9 Given the commitment assumption, the question of whether the planner should monitor or not needs only be examined ex-ante: If the addition of monitoring improves the e¤ectiveness of the contract, then the government should use monitoring and follow the monitoring scheme.
For an unemployed worker, the planner has six decision variables: consumption c, monitoring probability , and four continuation values, one for each possible outcome:
employment U e , unmonitored unemployment U n , monitored unemployment with a good signal U g , and monitored unemployment with a bad signal U b .
In addition to these six decisions, the planner recommends a job-search e¤ort level.
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When recommending a high job-search e¤ort level, the planner needs to support this recommendation by making it worthwhile for the worker to follow it. This is achieved with the incentive-compatibility constraint that guarantees that the expected utility for a worker who exerts high job-search e¤ort is at least as high as that for a worker who exerts low job-search e¤ort.
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Let V (U ) be the planner's value from an unemployed worker who has promised utility U . The planner's problem for an unemployed worker is:
where the objective function includes the cost of consumption payments to the worker and the discounted weighted values of the four possible outcomes. The constraints are promise keeping and incentive compatibility, discussed above. Since the incentive-compatibility constraint is binding at the optimum, I will henceforth use the equality sign in this constraint.
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By applying fairly standard results in dynamic programming, one obtains that W (U ) and V (U ) are continuous functions, that are decreasing, concave and continuously di¤er-entiable in U .
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incentives to expend high job-search e¤ort. According to the calibration, social assistance is optimal only for those values of promised utility associated with extremely high consumption levels, around 10 times the wage. Thus, in the simulations conducted the workers'promised utility values at the balanced budget point are far below these values. 12 This is the case because delivering an expected discounted utility that is higher than the required one, costs more. 13 Since the monitoring cost is concave in , V (U ) can be improved by using lotteries over the monitoring probability. This is a linear programming problem that can be solved numerically, as Phelan and Townsend (1991) show. I abstract from such lotteries in this section. In the quantitative analysis I use a linear monitoring cost that makes the use of such lotteries redundant.
Calibration
In order to characterize the optimal contract and to assess the savings associated with monitoring I calibrate the model to the US economy. Table 1 lists the model's parameters. The unit of time is set to one month. Preferences are log utility in consumption. The monthly discount factor is set to 0.9959 to match an annual interest rate of 5% (Cooley, 1995) . Monthly earnings, w; are set to $2,800, which is the median monthly earnings of all workers (DOL, 2006a) . The job-…nding probability is set to 0:17, based on the CPS-derived data constructed by Shimer (2005) . The disutility of work e¤ort, e w , which equals the disutility of job-search e¤ort, e, is equal to 0:67 as in Pavoni and Violante (2007) :
The monitoring technology is characterized by four parameters: the probabilities of a good signal given high and low job-search e¤ort, h and l , respectively, the monitoring cost per unit of monitoring , and the curvature of the monitoring cost .
The calibration of a good signal given the high and low job-search e¤ort levels ( h ; l ) of the current US system is quite challenging for two reasons. First, while in the model all workers have the incentives to search for a job with high e¤ort, it is unclear as to what fraction of workers indeed have those incentives. I therefore denote by ; the fraction of workers who search for a job with a high e¤ort in the current system. Second, h and l stem from a system imperfection that is unobservable to either the case worker or the economist.
Fortunately, the US Department of Labor is engaged in a systematic and detailed analysis of the adequacy of payments in the current UI system (Woodbury (2002) , DOL (2006b), Vroman and Woodbury (2001) ). These studies reveal the fraction of overpayment and underpayment (denial errors) paid to workers speci…cally for non-separation errors, thus excluding reasons such as ineligibility due to insu¢ cient previous earnings and quitting.
I proceed by providing explicit equations that connect h and l to the observed data, taking into account that only a fraction of workers, ; exerts the high e¤ort level. First, the fraction of overpayment, denoted by z 1 ; is equal to those who did not exert high e¤ort yet received payments relative to all those who received payments:
. Similarly, the fraction of underpayment, denoted by z 2 , is equal to:
Finally, the fraction of monitored workers who were sanctioned, denoted by z 3 ; is equal to:
(1 h ) +
(1 ) (1 l ) : Those three equations can be rewritten as an explicit unique solution of fz 1 ; z 2 ; z 3 g:
Based on various sources, the values for fz 1 ; z 2 ; z 3 g are f1:4%; 1:9%; 16%g, respectively:
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The implied values for the monitoring technology are: h = 0:98, l = 0:08 and = 0:84:
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The calibration of the signal probabilities implies a rather precise monitoring technology. The high value of h is in ‡uenced by actions taken after the sanctions were imposed, such as appeals, and redetermination (see Table ES -1 in DOL (1999) and DOL (2006b)).
The low level of l can be a¤ected by measures taken by workers to manipulate the system. If this is the case, then the value of overpayment (z 1 ) is higher and the value of l above is underestimated. The sensitivity analysis that follows shows, however, that the results are robust even to large increases of that value.
Before moving to the calibration of the remaining monitoring parameters, it should be stressed that the analysis presented in this paper is based on the actual monitoring technology applied in the US. Another direction of analysis is optimal monitoring precision, given a monitoring cost that increases with precision as in Boone, Fredriksson, Holmlund, and van Ours (2007) . Such a cost-e¤ectiveness analysis may lead to using either a lower precision-lower cost monitoring technology, or a higher precision-higher cost one.
The monitoring cost is based on data from The Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP, 2000) , where each caseworker was responsible for 100 clients and, among other tasks, was assigned to apply sanctions, assist with housing, and document client activities. Based on monthly gross earnings of $3,000 per caseworker and the described case load, the value of is $30 per month per each unemployed worker monitored. 16 This value is an approximation because, on one hand, the caseworkers were also engaged in activities other than monitoring and, on the other, they may have not monitored every month. Interestingly, although Boone, Fredriksson, Holmlund, and van Ours (2007) use completely di¤erent data sources, their equivalent value of = $27 is surprisingly close to the calibration presented here.
Since the veri…cation of employment contacts does not imply clear increasing or decreasing returns to scale I assume that = 1. I study the e¤ect of other values of in the sensitivity analysis. 
Results
This section is comprised of two parts. In the …rst, I discuss the characteristics of the optimal monitoring policy. In the second, I estimate the value of monitoring by comparing 
Optimal monitoring policy
The optimal contract is described recursively by six functions of the state variable U : c; U e ; U n ; U g ; U b ; : I begin with the mapping of current promised utility to next period's promised utility. In the optimal contract, the four future values, corresponding to the four possible outcomes, endogenously create implicit rewards and sanctions. Figure 2 shows the mapping of promised utility by outcome across periods. The horizontal axis is promised utility at the beginning of the period. The vertical axis is the next period's promised utility. The four future promised utilities are ordered as follows:
This follows directly from the likelihood ratios; with
where:
. Thus, the monitoring signal implies endogenous prize and sanction relative to unmonitored unemployment.
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If a good signal is realized then the worker receives a prize in continuation value of Upon employment -an outcome that can only happen in the model if the worker exerts a high job-search e¤ort -promised utility increases; upon monitoring with a good signal, the worker receives a reward that is only slightly below that of employment; upon unmonitored unemployment, the promised utility changes only slightly; …nally, upon monitoring with a bad signal the worker experiences a severe decrease in promised utility, implying that the planner …nds the bad signal highly informative and helpful in creating the necessary incentives.
The values of U n ; U g ; and U b , are jointly determined by the following condition, based on the three …rst-order conditions:
The likelihood ratio is de…ned as follows. For each outcome i 2 fe; g; b; ng de…ne p i 1 ; p i 2 as the probability of the outcome given high and low e¤ort levels, respectively. Then
approximation for the derivative of the planner's value function, the ratio of the sanction over the prize in continuation values
. This condition, together with the calibration of h at a level close to 1, implies that the sanction level is signi…cantly higher than the reward (the calibrated value of the ratio is 49). This result is consistent with the absence of prizes in the actual monitoring scheme, as prizes are relatively small.
More generally, in the optimal contract the prize and the sanction balance each other.
For high h signals, monitoring allocates modest prizes with a high probability and severe sanctions with a low probability. For low h signals, monitoring allocates high prizes with a low probability and modest sanctions with a high probability.
Figure 2 Approximately Here I now move to discuss monitoring frequency and utility spread decisions. Figure 3 shows monitoring frequency by promised utility. 18 Monitoring frequency varies across its complete support: for su¢ ciently low values of promised utility the cost of monitoring is too high and no monitoring takes place; for su¢ ciently high values of promised utility the opposite is the case, with monitoring frequency at its maximum value.
As for the spreads, observe that given the calibration of h ; U b is far lower than the other three future utilities. To demonstrate the dynamics of the spreads, I focus on the level of U b relative to U n : The dynamics of the remaining spreads are identical.
De…ne the relative consumption sanction as the fraction by which the next period's current consumption decreases upon a bad signal relative to that of unmonitored unemployment. Figure 4 shows the relative consumption sanction by promised utility. Note that the sanction is plotted only for levels of promised utility at which > 0:
Figures 3 and 4 Approximately Here 18 The high span of promised utility in this …gure, ranging from equivalent consumption levels of $20 to $200,000 per month, is used to demonstrate the contract's qualitative characteristics. As discussed below, the span of promised utility that includes the complete support of can be much smaller ( Figure  7) . The subsequent quantitative results are based on a …ne grid over a much smaller span. Therefore, the optimal contract dictates that as the generosity of the welfare system increases, the planner monitors the unemployed more frequently but imposes more moderate sanctions. This result is consistent with the observation of Boone, Fredriksson, Holmlund, and van Ours (2007) that when comparing US and Sweden's monitoring policies, the number of sanctions is inversely related to the severity of the penalty.
The policy implication of this result is that the generosity of the welfare system implies to what extent the monitoring policy should emphasize the sanction or the monitoring frequency.
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In order to understand the driving force behind the response of monitoring frequency and spread in future payments to promised utility it would be valuable to characterize the contract analytically. This would permit sharper statements about which parameters shape the optimal contract. Such a characterization is very challenging for the in…nite-horizon model. I therefore describe a two-period model in Appendix A that captures the same economic forces as the in…nite-horizon model. Speci…cally, the possible outcomes, their probabilities, and the choice variables of the planner are all identical to the in…nite-horizon model.
The analytical characteristics of the optimal contract for the two-period model include two propositions regarding the monitoring frequency and the spreads of future payments.
These propositions establish that the contract characteristics described above and depicted in …gures 3 and 4 are kept for any parametrization of the model. These parameters are those of the worker's preferences f ; eg, the labor market f ; eg, and the monitoring technology f h ; l ; ; g.
The key assumption that is required for the main result to hold is log-utility from consumption. To understand the importance of this assumption consider the cost of the two instruments of monitoring. The cost of applying monitoring is the monitoring cost : This cost is independent of the state of the worker. The cost of spreading out future utilities exists because the worker is risk averse and the planner needs to compensate the worker for the uncertainty in payments. I demonstrate below that for log utility this cost increases with promised utility. Hence, as promised utility increases, the planner shifts the composition of the two monitoring components by increasing the monitoring frequency and decreasing the spreads. 
The solution to this problem is c n = u 1 (U ) ; c e = u 1 U + e . The …rst-best solution is constant consumption across both future states, i.e., c n = c e = u 1 (U + e). The di¤erence between the …rst-best and the second-best planner's cost of providing consumption is then:
which is equal to the cost of spreading out the future values.
Using CRRA utility and di¤erentiating this cost with respect to promised utility gives:
The cost of spreading out future utilities increases with U if and only if this derivative is positive. This condition holds if and only is > . To see this notice that the …rst two terms in (5) comprise a lottery, whose expected value (U + e) appears in the third term.
The di¤erence between the value of the lottery and the value of the certainty equivalent 20 Newman (2007) …nds that = 0:5 is the critical value for determining the distribution of wealth across entrepreneurs and workers. 21 An interesting implication of this result is that the further the level of risk aversion is away from 1 2 , the sensitivity of to promised utility is greater because the change in the cost of spreading consumption is greater.
The value of monitoring
The planner's value from the optimal monitoring policy lies between the value of optimal unemployment insurance, which is a special case of monitoring with = 0, and the value of the …rst best. Thus, to study the e¤ectiveness of monitoring relative to unemployment insurance, I de…ne = Figure 5 shows the value of monitoring over the support of promised utility. Monitoring is relatively more e¤ective at high levels of promised utility because for log-utility preferences the cost of spreads increases with promised utility. At su¢ ciently low levels of promised utility, the optimal monitoring policy coincides with the optimal unemployment insurance policy. At the other extreme of promised utility, savings strictly increase even though is constant. This occurs because the cost of spreads continue to increase.
Figure 5 Approximately Here
Since the e¤ectiveness of monitoring varies signi…cantly across states, it would be interesting to measure the savings at the level of promised utility that balances the government's budget. The balanced budget point is U 0 ; such that V (U 0 ) = 0. This is the level of promised utility for when the costs of bene…ts, wage subsidies and monitoring are exactly covered by the tax revenues. 23 At U 0 for the model with no monitoring, the addition of monitoring saves 82% of the moral hazard cost. 22 The model with no monitoring is closely related to the model used in Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) . The main di¤erence is that in Hopenhayn and Nicolini the job-search e¤ort level is continuous and not discrete. For the sake of consistency I use a discrete level of e¤ort in both models. 23 This point is unique because V (U ) is strictly monotone in U .
At U 0 the monitoring frequency is 6% and the relative consumption sanction, which is approximately a permanent decrease in consumption, is 4:8%. The other three states lead to deviations on a scale much smaller than that of the relative consumption sanction.
In absolute values the savings at the balanced budget point amounts to $87 per worker -out of the $106 possible. The potential savings of $106 is limited since the optimal unemployment insurance contract a la Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) already closely approaches the …rst best by being conditional on the complete history of the worker and allowing the tax to depend on that history as well.
Who should be monitored?
As noted above, monitoring is especially e¤ective for workers for whom the cost of spreading utilities is high. I have so far discussed the e¤ects of promised utility and risk aversion on this cost. There are, however, other parameters that a¤ect the cost of spreading utilities.
The cost of spreading future utilities increases with e: As e increases, the planner needs to provide stronger incentives for the worker to exert the high e¤ort. In the extreme case of e = 0; there is no need to spread out future values at all. In the other extreme case of very high disutility from search, the cost would be too high to rationalize the high-e¤ort recommendation.
In addition, the cost of spreading future utilities decreases with . As increases the job-…nding probability associated with a high e¤ort is further separated from the low e¤ort one. This means that the information that the planner receives from the employment state of the worker becomes more precise. The extreme case of = 1 is isomorphic to observable e¤ort. In the other extreme case for = 0 the planner cannot provide incentives for the worker to expend a high e¤ort.
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Monitoring will thus be relatively more e¤ective not only for more-generous welfare systems but also for two types of workers: discouraged unemployed workers who have a high disutility from work (or a high utility from leisure) and workers with low job-…nding probability. This …nding well …ts the application of monitoring to such workers.
Quantitatively, changes in disutility from work or the job-…nding probability can substantially a¤ect the contract. In the case of log utility, for example, changes in e or in a¤ect the cost of spreads exponentially. Note that unlike the e¤ect of promised utility on spreading costs that is sensitive to risk aversion, the e¤ects of e and on the cost of spreads are independent of risk aversion.
But what about the dynamics of monitoring over the unemployment spell? Conditional on unemployment, promised utility decreases along the unemployment spell; hence, qualitatively monitoring should decrease and sanctions should increase (for >
2
). Quantitatively, however, for log utility the optimal monitoring scheme is fairly insensitive to such changes in promised utility. The planner can therefore use a …xed monitoring frequency together with a …xed sanction. This relatively simple monitoring scheme would deliver almost the same gains as the optimal one.
What makes monitoring e¤ective?
In optimal unemployment insurance, the planner is required to spread out future utilities to create the job-search incentives. This action is costly since the worker is risk-averse.
Thus, the reduction in the planner's cost due to monitoring can only be achieved by consumption smoothing. To demonstrate this as well as assess the smoothing intensity, I
simulate the consumption paths for the optimal unemployment insurance model and for the monitoring model. Figure 6 shows three examples of consumption paths according to the two policies. In each example, the worker starts o¤ unemployed with a promised utility level of U 0 , stays unemployed for 3 periods, and then …nds a job. In the top panel, there is no monitoring.
In the middle panel, monitoring is applied in periods 1, 2 and 3, resulting in a good signal in all three cases. In the bottom panel, monitoring is applied once in period 1, resulting in a bad signal.
Figure 6 Approximately Here
In the absence of additional signals, the consumption paths for optimal unemployment insurance for these three cases are identical and are presented here as a reference. Consumption in the unemployment insurance model …rst decreases monotonically and then increases signi…cantly when the worker …nds a job. These shifts in consumption are required for creating the necessary incentives for unemployed workers to expend high e¤ort given that only two possible outcomes are possible.
In contrast, consumption in the monitoring model varies very little, excluding the third panel, where the worker is sanctioned. Note, however, that sanctions are a rare event; they only happen when both monitoring and a bad signal occur. At the balanced budget point the unconditional probability of a sanction, (1 h ) ; is about 0:12%. This is equivalent, on average, to sanctioning one of about 800 unemployed workers or sanctioning an unemployed worker once every 70 years!
The simulation shows that due to the additional information regarding the job-search e¤ort, monitoring allows the planner to smooth unemployed workers'consumption. Simulating the model over 60 periods and 5,000 workers shows that the standard deviation of consumption in the monitoring model is less than half the standard deviation of consumption in the model without monitoring.
Sensitivity Analysis
The comparison above between the models with and without monitoring relies on the e¤ectiveness of monitoring, which in turn relies on the four parameters of monitoring technology: the probabilities of a good signal given high and low job-search e¤ort h and l , respectively; the cost per unit of monitoring ; and the concavity of the monitoring cost . In order to examine the sensitivity of the savings to these parameters I analyze the response of savings at the balanced budget point to various values of these four parameters.
The probability of a good signal given the high job-search e¤ort h determines the precision of the information extracted by applying monitoring. As h increases, the planner receives more accurate information on the level of the worker's job-search. In the extreme case when h = 1; it is possible to get arbitrarily close to the …rst-best allocation by using a combination of a very low monitoring frequency (that costs very little) with an extremely severe punishment that is never applied. Table 2 presents the savings at the balanced budget point for various levels of h .
Holding l and …xed, as h increases beyond the benchmark value, the e¢ ciency of monitoring increases as expected. As h decreases, the savings level decreases sharply; at a value of h = 0:90 the savings is 61%. Note, however, that the system of equations (3) implies that the lower bound for h is 0.84 (since z 3 = 0:16 and h > l ). Table 2 Approximately Here
The sensitivity analysis of l in Table 3 shows that monitoring's e¢ ciency depends on the di¤erence between the precision of the two signals ( h ; l ). As l gets closer to h ; savings decrease signi…cantly. As noted above, if overpayment is underestimated because workers can manipulate the system then the value of l is underestimated. Note however, that according to (3) when z 1 increases, in addition to the increase in l , the fraction of workers with high job-search e¤ort ( ) decreases signi…cantly while h does not change Table 5 shows the savings for various values of the cost curvature . Since is kept …xed, increasing the curvature parameter implies lower costs and increased savings.
More interesting is the dynamics of the monitoring frequency and the spreads over U given convex costs. While V is concave in for any quasi-concave cost, it is also concave for some convex costs (see proof of Claim 1 in Appendix D). Since supermodularity (see proposition 1 in Appendix 1) holds for any cost curvature, the dynamics of the monitoring probability and the spreads are expected to hold, at least weakly, for convex costs as well. Table 5 Approximately Here Figure 7 shows the monitoring frequency for 2 f0:5; 1:0; 1; 5g. This demonstrates the wide spectrum of results that the model can generate. For some parameterizations, such as high , choosing 2 f0; 1g and the corresponding sanction may be a decent rule of thumb. For other parameterizations, such as a low , a …xed monitoring frequency and a …xed sanction may be close to optimal.
Figures 7 and 8 Approximately Here
Note that the monitoring frequency for any two levels of curvature 1 and 2 cross when the marginal cost of monitoring is equalized at = exp
Concluding remarks
Governments monitor the job-search activities of unemployed workers in order to increase the e¤ectiveness of unemployment insurance. Doing so involves randomly monitoring job-search e¤ort and receiving, at a cost, a signal that is related to the e¤ort level. Such additional information plays an important role in the design of unemployment insurance schemes.
In this paper I added a monitoring technology to the optimal unemployment insurance framework. The framework allowed characterization of the optimal contract and evaluation of the gain from using the monitoring technology.
Allowing the signal to be realistically imperfect had two important advantages. Qualitatively, the optimal-contract included a non-trivial decision of the monitoring probability; it dictated endogenous limited sanctions and rewards; and sanctions were applied in equilibrium. Quantitatively, this technology permitted a reasonable estimation of the e¤ectiveness of monitoring based on the actual monitoring technology in the US.
I showed how the two components of monitoring, the monitoring frequency and the spread of continuation values, complement each other, depending on the state of the worker and utility from consumption. For CRRA utility, the monitoring frequency increased and the spreads decreased with promised utility if and only if > , while the cost of monitoring is invariant to that value.
In the quantitative analysis conducted at the balanced budget point, I showed that compared to optimal unemployment insurance, monitoring saves about 80% of the cost associated with moral hazard. The gain was achieved by a decrease of more than half in the standard deviation of consumption.
One limitation of the framework used in this paper is that the model's tractability depends on the assumption that the planner controls the worker's consumption, i.e., no savings is allowed on the worker's side. As pointed out by Abdulkadiroglu, Kuruscu, and Sahin (2002) and Shimer and Werning (2008) , allowing workers to accumulate unobservable savings may signi…cantly a¤ect the results. Nevertheless, the recursive contract framework demonstrates the main trade-o¤s when a costly imperfect signal is available.
It appears that as long as di¤erentiation of future payments is necessary, not only will monitoring be e¤ective, but the trade-o¤s presented in this framework should likewise hold. Also to be considered is that when the framework presented here is applied to other contexts, such as crime and punishment, the no-savings assumption is perfectly reasonable.
Another limitation of that framework is that the sanctions are unjusti…ed. This occurs because the incentive-compatibility constraint in the model holds. Nevertheless, these sanctions need to be placed in the contract to keep the workers' incentives in place.
Note that the same concept of unjusti…ed punishments holds in optimal unemployment insurance. There, conditional on unemployment, the worker experiences bene…t cuts even though the planner is aware that the worker abides the e¤ort recommendation. A more realistic model would include unobserved heterogeneity in disutility from job-search and from work. Under such circumstances, the sanctions in equilibrium would be partially justi…ed.
Alternatively, heterogeneity can be introduced through wages. This would allow conditioning the initial level of promised utility on the wage of each type of worker, thus indexing the unemployment insurance bene…ts to the worker's wage. Indeed, this practice is applied in most OECD countries.
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According to Grubb (2000) , there are signi…cant di¤erences across countries in all the policy's main characteristics. For example, consider Australia and the US. In Australia, a moderate sanction of 18% of the bene…ts level is applied for a duration of 26 weeks. This is considerably a longer and a more spread out sanction relative to the one week denial of bene…ts in the US. At the same time, Australia's annual sanction rate, standing at 1.2%, is relatively low when compared with the 33% in the US. An extended model could reveal whether the variation in policies follows labor market characteristics or some ine¢ ciencies.
Although the paper's focus was the monitoring of unemployed workers, the modeling environment presented was rather general. This implies that the model can be used for a wide array of problems, when the planner is able to use a costly imperfect signal to learn about the agent's hidden information or action.
The analysis of monitoring can also be applied to systems in which the probability of a good signal in the wake of high e¤ort is very low. In that case, the prize relative to the sanction will be very high. Then, a near optimal implementation of the contract may include a prize only. Indeed, this characterization is consistent with competitions.
APPENDIX A: A TWO-PERIOD MODEL
In the absence of theoretical results for the in…nite-horizon model, this appendix includes a theoretical characterization of a two-period model that captures the same economic forces as the in…nite-horizon model. Speci…cally, the possible outcomes, their probabilities, and the choice variables of the planner are all identical to the in…nite-horizon problem. The following adjustments take place in the two-period model: W (U ) becomes w c e ; U i becomes u (c i ) for i 2 fe; n; g; bg ; and V (U i ) becomes c i for i 2 fn; g; bg.
I impose a logarithmic utility function. The generalization of the results to CRRA preferences is discussed in Section 5. Finally, for simplicity, I assume that = 1.
The problem of the planner for an unemployed worker is then:
c;c e ;c n ;c g ;c b ;
For the exposition of the proof it is useful to set the problem in two steps. In the …rst step we solve for M (U; ), which is identical to (6) above except that the monitoring frequency is given exogenously. In the second step we solve for V (U ) = max M (U; ) : The Lagrangian of M (U; ) is:
where 1 and 2 are the Lagrange multipliers of the promise keeping and incentive-compatibility constraints, respectively. Note that both 1 and 2 are negative.
I start the characterization of the optimal contract with two results regarding the relative values of consumption levels. The …rst result refers to the ranking of the future consumption levels.
Lemma 1 In the optimal solution, c e > c g > c n > c b .
Proof. This follows directly from the likelihood ratios with l e > l g > l n > l b ; where: Lemma 2 In the optimal solution current consumption equals to an average of future consumption levels, weighted by the probabilities given high e¤ort for outcomes i 2 fe; n; g; bg :
Proof. The …rst-order conditions of (7) with respect to the choices of future consumption levels c i ; i 2 fe; n; g; bg are:
Averaging (8) over outcomes i with the respective high-e¤ort probabilities yields that
Using the …rst-order condition of (7) with respect to the choice of current consumption yields 1 = c, implying that
27 Note that for brevity of notation, I omit the state fU; g from c i ; 1 ; 2 although these are functions of the state.
Lemma 2 simply states that the shadow prices of the promise keeping constraint is equal to the weighted average of the reciprocals of marginal utility, which for log utility equals to consumption itself.
Before moving to the main propositions regarding the optimal contract, we can gain insights on the optimal contract from the two Lemmas above. First, using ( Note that as long as h > l , h = 1 provides a perfect signal regardless of the value of l . This is so because upon receiving a bad signal, the planner knows with certainty that the worker deviated from the recommended level of e¤ort. This event, regardless of its probability, can be leveraged as much as needed to provide the incentives for the worker to exert the high level of e¤ort.
I now move to the e¤ect of the worker's state on the monitoring frequency and the spread of future consumption. The proof is inspired by Newman (2007) .
Proposition 1
The optimal monitoring frequency increases with U:
Proof. I …rst show that M (U; ) is supermodular in U; . For a twice di¤erentiable function, this is equivalent to showing that
Since 1 is the shadow price of the promised utility constraint @M (U; ) @U is equal to 1 ; therefore the supermodularity condition becomes:
and therefore:
is the total cost for the planner providing that level of utility excluding the monitoring cost. Since the monitoring cost is excluded, the cost of providing utility cannot increase when monitoring increases.
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Therefore:
and supermodularity between U and holds.
Supermodularity implies that increasing one variable enlarges the returns from increasing the other variables (Athey, 2002) . In the monitoring context, supermodularity implies that increasing the promised utility improves the return to monitoring. Therefore, as long as the …rst-order condition with respect to the monitoring frequency holds for V (U ), the monitoring frequency increases with promised utility.
Monitoring frequency is one of the two instruments of monitoring policy. The second instrument is the choice of the planner to spread out future utilities (henceforth, spreads).
To simplify the discussion de…ne the spreads as positive ones as follows: The spread between promised utility of outcomes fi; jg 2 fe; n; g; bg is u(c
The next main result, Proposition 2, complements the …rst by showing that as promised 28 Denote the initial monitoring probability with 1 and the new higher probability by 2 > 1 . The planner can ignore the additional information by using a lottery on the monitoring application with weight = 1 2 . When monitoring is applied (with probability 2 ) the planner will use the same allocation given 1 with probability ; and the allocation given that monitoring was not applied with probability 1 . utility increases, the spreads decrease. The next Lemma provides an important building block for this result :
Lemma 3 When either or U , or both, change, all the spreads move in the same direction.
Proof. Let c :
Since
, if one spread decreases, then the rest of the spreads must decrease as well.
Proposition 2 The spreads decrease with promised utility.
Proof. Rewrite the incentive-compatibility constraint as a linear combination of spreads.
Using (9), the e¤ect of an increase in the monitoring probability on the left-hand side of the constraint can be written as:
The right-hand term is strictly positive because h > l and c g > c b : Therefore, the total e¤ect of the increase in the monitoring frequency on the left-hand side is strictly positive if the …rst term is non-negative. For log utility, this is equivalent to showing that:
Since at the optimum, c n = h c g + (1 h )c b (see Lemma 2 above), the inequality above holds as the logarithmic function is a concave transformation of f (c) = c:
Hence, following an increase in , at least one spread must decrease to keep the constraint tight; by Lemma 3 all the spreads drop together.
Since we know from Proposition 1 that an increase in U leads to an increase in the monitoring frequency, and since an increase in the monitoring frequency leads to a decrease in the spreads, it follows that an increase in U also leads to a decrease in the spreads.
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Note that together with Lemma 3, condition (9) implies that if the monitoring frequency is constant, then all spreads are constant as well. This is so because the coe¢ cients of all spreads in (9) are all positive, and they can only move in the same direction.
Taken together, the two above propositions suggest that as the promised utility of the worker increases, the planner monitors the unemployed more frequently but imposes more moderate sanctions. Note that this result holds for any parametrization of the model as long as utility from consumption is logarithmic.
29 Equation (9) also shows that U may a¤ect the spreads only when there is a change in . This rules out combined e¤ects such as a decrease in the spreads due to the increase in the monitoring probability and the independent increase in the spread following a change in U:
APPENDIX B: COMPUTATIONAL METHOD This appendix describes the solution method for the problem of a planner who recommends the high job-search e¤ort during unemployment.
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Transform the maximization problem with six decision variables and two constraints into a maximization problem with four decision variables and no constraints. Write the incentive-compatibility constraint as follows:
and express U e in terms of U n ; U g ; U b and :
Use the promise keeping constraint to express c in terms of U e ; U n ; U g ; U b and :
Use (10) in the right-hand side of (11) to express the consumption level (c) in terms of U n ; U g ; U b and : Substitute this value of c and the value for U e from (10) into (2) to receive the maximization problem with four decision variables: U n ; U g ; U b and ; with no constraints.
Those four remaining decision variables consist of three continuation values (U n ; U g ; U b ) and the monitoring frequency . While the support for the continuation values is the real line, the support for the monitoring frequency is [0; 1]. This closed support presents a computational challenge, which I overcome by distcritizing the support of the monitoring 30 In absence of asymmetric information, the solution to the employment problem consists of constant bene…ts for the complete duration of employment. 31 In the optimal solution, the incentive compatibility constraint always holds with equality. This is the case because delivering an expected discounted utility that is higher than the required one, costs more. frequency into 151 values and then solve the maximization problem for each of those 151 values. 32 Thus, the maximization problem is reduced to three continuous variables:
The solution to this problem is based on the three …rst-order conditions with respect to U n ,U g , and U b respectively:
where I have de…ned for brevity of notation:
These equations are solved over a grid of fU; g with 600 and 151 values respectively.
The value for V (U ) is then the maximum value of V for a given U over all possible levels of monitoring probability. 32 The sensitivity of the solution is, therefore, 0:0033 of monitoring frequency.
APPENDIX C: THE MONITORING PROBABILITY IN THE US
The calibration of the actual monthly monitoring probability in the US, ACT , is based on the frequency of required reports of employment contacts that the unemployed workers …ll in and on the probability that these contacts are veri…ed. While the weekly frequency of reports is fairly consistent across states (O'Leary 2004), the probability or verifying these contacts varies vastly across states: some states (e.g. Pennsylvania) do not monitor at all; some states (e.g. Washington) have a target monitoring frequency of 10%; and some states (e.g. South Dakota) consistently review contacts every 4-6 weeks (DOL 2003) .
For the probability of verifying employment contacts in the US, I use a conservative value of 5% (the lower this probability the lower is h ). This value determines, together with a weekly frequency of reports, a monthly monitoring probability ACT of 20%. Proof. Use the promise keeping and incentive-compatibility constraints to derive c;
and U e as a function of U g ; U n ; U b and :
Substitute the constraints into the maximization problem:
Di¤erentiate twice with respect to :
which is strictly negative for every 1 since u 1 is convex and W is concave. Note that since the …rst two terms are strictly negative for any , the claim also holds for some convex cost of monitoring. Pavoni and Violante (2007) Good signal probability given high e¤ort Fig. 1 . The timing of the model and the four possible end-of-period outcomes: employment, unmonitored unemployment, monitored unemployment with a good signal, and monitored unemployment with a bad signal. Fig. 2 . The mapping of promised utility from the current period to the next period, conditioned on the four possible outcomes: employment, unmonitored unemployment, monitored unemployment with a good signal, and monitored unemployment with a bad signal. The values for employment and monitoring with a good signal are above the diagonal (the diagonal itself is not illustrated) with the one for the good signal only slightly below the one for employment. The value for unmonitored unemployment is only slightly below the diagonal. Finally, the value for monitored unemployment with a bad signal is signi…cantly below the diagonal. Fig. 3 . The monitoring frequency by promised utility. As the generosity of the welfare system increases, the monitoring frequency increases and the relative consumption sanction (Fig. 4) decreases. Fig. 4 . The relative consumption sanction by promised utility. The sanction responds to changes in the monitoring frequency (Figure 3) . Note that when the monitoring frequency is constant, so is the sanction. Fig. 5 . The value of monitoring as the fraction of moral-hazard cost associated with optimal unemployment insurance that is saved when the monitoring technology is available. Fig. 6 . Simulated consumption paths according to optimal monitoring and optimal unemployment insurance policies. The consumption paths for the unemployment insurance policy are identical. The consumption paths for the monitoring policy depend on whether monitoring was applied and the signal's result. (Fig. 7) .
